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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A group of university students quietly sat down in front of a government building
in Hong Kong’s Admiralty district on September 26, 2014. A few weeks earlier, Hong
Kong media outlets had announced that the dialogue between Mainland China and Hong
Kong regarding electoral reforms had fallen through. The Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress, China’s de facto legislature, ostensibly approved of Hong
Kong’s bid for national elections with one major caveat: All candidates must be handselected by the communist authorities in Beijing. “This is a fake democratic proposal,”
remarked Hong Kong lawmaker Albert Chan, echoing the sentiments of thousands of
disgruntled and disappointed Hong Kong residents.1
The student sit-in at the Admiralty building was the culmination of a week-long
boycott organized by student groups Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of
Students. Scholarism’s teenage leader, Joshua Wong, explained in a call to action that:
“Political reform is the core problem for every issue. Everyone knows that under the
Chinese Communist party, there is a lack of possibility to fight [for] true universal
suffrage in the end…but students should stand on the front line in every century.”2 Just

Tiffany Ap, “Can Hong Kong’s July 1 pro-democracy march energize political reform bid?” CNN, July 1,
2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/01/asia/hong-kong-july-democracy-march/
2
Demetri Sevastopulo, “Teenager Joshua Wong picks up democracy baton in Hong Kong,” Financial
Times, September 22, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9d52261c-421e-11e4-981800144feabdc0.html#axzz3fDoGeZ4z
1
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two days later, the students were joined by thousands of protestors as they marched
through the streets of Hong Kong’s glittering, high-tech commercial district. Activists
blocked key intersections, paralyzing traffic, as riot police launched canisters of tear gas
into the peaceful crowd. In response to the noxious gas, activists raised umbrellas painted
with pro-democracy messages, and thus the Umbrella Movement was born.3
To some, this scene might appear reminiscent of images of demonstrators in
Egypt and Iran in the preceding years, where young people took to the streets amidst a
storm of tweets, texts, and blog posts. The Arab Spring movement of 2011 ignited an
ongoing discussion about the role of communication technology in social movements,
causing journalists and scholars alike to examine how platforms like mobile phone
technology and the internet could be harnessed by activists in order to disseminate prodemocratic messages and mobilize against authoritarian regimes. Egyptian president
Hosni Mubarak was ousted in less than three weeks in a relatively bloodless revolution
after millions of activists took to social media to express their discontent and organize
mass protests. The 2009 election protest in Iran and the 2011 revolution in Tunisia were
described as “Twitter revolutions,” a name referencing the primary instrument utilized by
activists. When Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement burst onto the international stage in
2014, one might have assumed that, like in Egypt and Tunisia in the years prior, the
collective fervor of youthful activists would flood the streets and social media in equal
measure and ultimately lead to another major victory for democracy. But that never
happened, largely based on China’s skillful handling of the movement.

“Hong Kong protests: Timeline of the occupation,” BBC News, December 11, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30390820.
3
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The Umbrella movement was in fact just the most recent of a series of protests
stretching back to 2003 when pro-democracy activists first expressed their discontent
with the encroaching authoritarian policies of Mainland China. These protests largely
spark from the struggle between Hong Kong to exert a higher degree of democratic selfrule and China’s policy of centralized control. Specifically, the issues of free elections
and freedom of expression have generated a high degree of public contention.
Although the frequency of Hong Kong’s protests could lead observers to believe
otherwise, Hong Kong is not administered by a regime that encourages free political
discourse or permits government criticism. Restrictive policies imposed by the People’s
Republic of China are geared towards limiting the transmission of information deemed
controversial, politically sensitive, or anti-government. Individuals found participating in
subversive communications could realistically face arrest and imprisonment.4 On a larger
scale, the government has openly engineered mass internet blackouts in regions of China
embroiled in social unrest where demonstrations are believed to have been organized
using technology like the internet and mobile phones. Despite such restrictions, Hong
Kong has experienced a number of mass protests since 1997. This raises questions
regarding how communication can be used as a tool to either advance or limit democratic
progress in social movements like the Umbrella protest. Additionally, one may ask why
recent social movements in Egypt and Tunisia succeeded while Hong Kong’s did not,
despite activists having very similar digital tools at their disposal.

4

Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph M. Chan, "Professionalism, Political Orientation, and Perceived SelfCensorship: A Survey Study of Hong Kong Journalists" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
International Communication Association, TBA, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, May 21, 2008).

3

The relationship between communication technology and social movements is far
from novel. Johannes Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press in 1450 demonstrates
how technological change can facilitate social change. His invention is credited with
playing a key developmental role in the Renaissance, Reformation, and Scientific
Revolution. More recently, Radio Free Europe was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in
1991 for its role in bringing down the Iron Curtain.5 Within the last decade, information
and communication technologies (ICTs) have been lauded by some as a voice piece of
the oppressed and tool for liberation, prompting prominent figures like Egyptian activist
and Google Entrepreneur Wael Ghonim to espouse, “if you want to liberate a society, just
give them the internet.”6 Yet despite the rallying power of digital communication,
Freedom House reported in 2015 that more countries experienced declines in freedom
than gains for the ninth consecutive year despite global surges in internet and mobile
phone connectivity.7 Freedom House additionally reported a major increase in
surveillance and overall decline in internet freedom, despite more people than ever being
connected to the web.8

5

Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs,
2012), 20.
6
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: The Critique of Functionalist Reason
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Cyrus Farivar, interviewed by Tony Cox, Internet: Road to
Democracy…or Elsewhere? NPR, August 15, 2011.
7
“Freedom in the World 2015,” Freedom House, accessed February 14, 2016,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.VsCv1_krLIU; “Mobile Phone
Internet User Penetration Worldwide from 2012 to 2017,” Statista, accessed July 8, 2015,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/284202/mobile-phone-internet-user-penetration-worldwide/
8
Uri Friedman, “Will the World Grow More Authoritarian in 2014?” The Atlantic, January 6, 2014,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/will-the-world-grow-more-authoritarian-in2014/282840/
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As many authoritarian regimes around the world defy the inevitable collapse
outlined in democratic transition theory,9 a growing body of research calls into question
the liberating effects of ICTs and even demonstrates how ICTs can be effectively used
against the populace. Cyber-communication has given rise to extensive and elaborate
surveillance systems capable of tracking and recording details about internet users,
essentially stripping away the protective shield of privacy. Skeptics are also concerned by
the medium’s susceptibility to transmitting false information and giving rumors the
veneer of fact.10 Contrary to popular assumptions, China in particular is actively
promoting the usage of ICTs in order to facilitate economic growth, a policy which
demonstrates China’s confidence in its own abilities to adapt to the challenges posed by
digital communication.11 Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton succinctly
tackled the duality of global communication technologies in a recent speech, stating that:
Amid this unprecedented surge in connectivity, we must also recognize that these
technologies are not an unmitigated blessing. These tools are also being exploited to
undermine human progress and political rights. Just as steel can be used to build hospitals
or machine guns, or nuclear power can either energize a city or destroy it, modern
information networks and the technologies they support can be harnessed for good or for
ill. The same networks that help organize movements for freedom also enable al-Qaida to
spew hatred and incite violence against the innocent. And technologies with the potential
to open up access to government and promote transparency can also be hijacked by
governments to crush dissent and deny human rights. 12

Despite this seemingly clean division in technology’s perceived political
alignment, the reality is much more nuanced. In truth, ICTs are simply tools without any
inherent moral, political, or ethical substance, and are therefore impossible to generalize

9

Democratic transition theory explains the process through which non-democratic societies evolve towards
democracy. (Sujian Guo, “Democratic Transition: A Critical Overview,” Issues & Studies 34 (1999): 133148.)
10
Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, 17.
11
Qinfeng Zhu and Marko M. Skoric, “The Role of ICT’s in Adaptive and Persistent Authoritarianism: A
Study of China at the Administrative Division Level” (paper presented at 47 th Hawaii International
Conference on System Science, Waikoloa, Hawaii, January 6-9, 2014).
12
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” (presentation, Washington D.C., January 21,
2010).
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from case to case. Simply because ICTs were integral to drastic political changes in
Egypt does not mean all pro-democracy movements will experience the same level of
success. In fact, in some cases, governments can expertly wield these digital tools to
repress social movements and protect their own power.
Broadly, this project seeks to understand why the Hong Kong protests failed to
bring about meaningful democratic reforms despite the immense popular support of the
movement. Even compared to earlier social movements in Hong Kong, which
successfully pressured China to back down or negotiate on controversial policies, the
Umbrella Movement was a failure.13 Yet, through the months of protests gripping Hong
Kong, China barely lifted a finger in terms of employing coercive tactics like violence or
physical intimidation, the traditional weapons in any authoritarian state’s arsenal. In the
past, China has not shied away from being blatant with its tactics. When unrest erupted in
China’s Xinjiang province in 2009, the government shut down the entire internet for ten
months until protests subsided.14 The abortive “Jasmine Revolution” of 2011, directly
inspired by Tunisia’s own revolution, was met with brutality as activists were beaten,
arrested, and disappeared by Chinese authorities.15 Other than tear gas and a police
perimeter, which is not uncommon even in democratic societies, nothing blatantly
repressive took place in Hong Kong, yet the movement was shut down just the same amid

13

“Huge Protest Fills HK Streets,” CNN.com, last modified July 2, 2003.
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/hk.protest/; “Hong Kong backs down over
Chinese patriotism classes.” BBC News, September 8, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china19529867
14
Chris Hogg, “China restores Xinjiang internet,” BBC News, May14, 2010.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8682145.stm.
15
Damian Grammaticas, “Calls for protests in China met with brutality,” BBC News, February 28, 2011.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12593328
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reports of coercion, surveillance, and mass censorship. The PRC approached the Hong
Kong protests with a level of subtlety and sleight of hand that seems out of character
compared to their handling of Mainland protests. This disparity raises the question of
why the PRC approached the Umbrella Movement so differently while still ensuring that
activists did not meet their goal of democratic reform.
In order to understand the reasons for the Umbrella movement’s failure, we must
consider how specifically the government addressed the protests and the motivation
behind its actions. This paper ultimately aims to answer the question: Why did the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) use ICTs to limit activists’ freedom of speech and
collective action during the Umbrella Movement? While the PRC’s ultimate motivation
of upholding the balance of power is clear, it is unknown why China did not crack down
on Hong Kong’s activists with the same blunt, repressive force it has historically used
against Mainland social movements.
While the role of ICTs in the hands of activists is well researched, less attention
has been focused on how governments utilize the same technology to defuse collective
action in order to maintain their grip on power. In the case of China, prior research on the
government’s methods of social control have largely focused on Mainland groups and
activists.16 China’s response to the Umbrella Movement is novel for two reasons. First,
China largely shied away from using physical repression. Second, the PRC sought to
apply authoritarian tactics of social control to Hong Kong, a territory which enjoys legal
freedom of expression and a traditionally laissez-faire approach to the exchange of ideas
and opinions. Hong Kong’s unique relationship with China creates an opening for

Francis Lee, “Power and Strength of Networked Media and Connective Action: The Case of Hong
Kong’s Umbrella Movement,” Communication Research and Practice, 6 (2016): 11-44.
16
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insightful new research. This project aims to explore and understand the technologybased methods of social control the PRC employed to both lessen the impact of and limit
the momentum of the Hong Kong protest. Additionally, this project will seek to shed
light on why the PRC opted to adopt ICTs for subtle methods of social control rather than
relying on physical force to assert its power. Overall, the research will provide a more
nuanced understanding of the methods of social control employed by modern
authoritarian states.
While any conclusions drawn in this paper will not be generalizable in the sense
that they can be applied to cases outside the Umbrella movement, they will nevertheless
contribute to a less-explored aspect of the relationship of technology and social
movements, and will shed light on the PRC’s evolving approach to internal unrest. At its
core, this project will provide an in-depth case study analysis of the Umbrella Movement,
focusing on the specific reasons the PRC utilized ICTs to maintain their grip on power in
the face of a rising tide of dissent. The events of the protest will be analyzed through the
lens of authoritarian consolidation theory and collective action theory, which will provide
a framework for understanding the resilience and surprisingly adaptive nature of
authoritarian regimes despite external pressures to reform. An additional factor to
consider, while not a primary focus of the study, is how specifically activists reacted to
PRC censorship and surveillance actions.
This paper is divided into seven chapters which will provide perspective and
commentary on the ongoing scholarly debate regarding ICTs and government control,
and will also provide a detailed examination of Hong Kong’s Umbrella protest utilizing
recognized theories of authoritarian consolidation and collective action. Specifically, the

8

discussion will examine why the PRC used ICTs for the purposes of subtle methods of
social control, such as censorship and surveillance of pro-democracy activists. Chapter
two will conduct a detailed review of related literature, compiling prior investigations
related to technology, social movements, and authoritarian control and synthesizing the
material into a framework for this study. Chapter three provides an overview of several
key theories and how they can be applied to understanding the role technology plays in
authoritarian control. Chapter four outlines the methodological approach this project is
adopting, and implements the method in a case study analysis of a major pro-democratic
protests that took place in Hong Kong in 2014. The fifth and sixth chapters will provide
historical context for the event followed by a case study analysis of discussion of the
study’s results. Lastly, chapter six is the project’s denouement and will focus on
concluding remarks and lessons learned from the study.

9

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

With over six hundred million internet users, China is the most networked country
on the planet, yet has some of the tightest controls on information and digital discourse.17
A recent study observed that internet usage is ubiquitous among college students in
Beijing, yet most students could not identify the iconic image of a man facing down a
tank during the 1989 protests at Tiananmen Square.18 Nearly all references to the last
major protest to have occurred in Mainland China have been removed from the web.19
Gaps in information such as this one raise an entire host of questions regarding the ability
of ICTs to foster meaningful, deliberative discourses between individuals in politically
closed environments. This research question was designed to investigate why Hong
Kong’s Umbrella Movement failed to achieve its objectives, despite the successful prodemocratic movements that took place in Tunisia and Egypt with the aid of ICTs and
social media.
Since the Umbrella Movement’s failure hinges on the PRC’s ability to manage
and contain the movement, this project will focus on the government’s counter-measures
and underlying motivations. This project is unique in that seeks to shed light on why the
PRC chose to adopt ICTs for subtle methods of social control rather than relying on

17

The World Factbook. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Continually
updated. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
18
Ibid.
19
Rebecca MacKinnon,“China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism,’” Journal of Democracy 22 (2011): 33.
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physical force to assert its power as it has historically controlled protests on the
Mainland. Recent mass protests in Mainland China, such as the 2009 outbreak in
Xinjiang and the 2011 Jasmine Revolution, were blatantly repressed through a
combination of violence, arrests, and an extended internet blackout in the case of
Xinjiang.20 The following case study will examine exactly why the PRC’s tactics differed
so drastically in Hong Kong.
China is a major topic of interest for scholars from a variety of disciplines, and a
plethora of research exists investigating the intersection between social movements and
the communist regime’s elaborate system of social control. Despite the preponderance of
scholarship on this particular question, the vast majority of the research concerns
Mainland China with less attention focused on China’s Special Administrative Regions
(SARs) such as Hong Kong.
As a SAR, Hong Kong has a unique relationship with China that is not politically
equivalent to that of a Mainland province. Hong Kong is technically ruled by Beijing, but
the rules of their relationship are determined by the treaties and constitution co-written by
the United Kingdom and China upon Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997. As a result,
Hong Kong’s administrative and legal structure differ in key ways from China’s
Mainland provinces’. One major difference is that Hong Kongers are legally guaranteed
the right to free speech.21 In the context of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, this raises
the question of why Beijing interfered at all. Hong Kong’s unique and markedly un-

20

Chris Hogg, “China restores Xinjiang internet,” BBC News, May14, 2010.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8682145.stm.; Damian Grammaticas, “Calls for protests in China met with
brutality,” BBC News, February 28, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12593328
21
“Chapter III: Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents,” Last modified July 13, 2012,
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_3.html.
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Mainland political and legal climate also call into question whether the conclusions of
studies of Mainland social movements can be applied to the Umbrella Movement. With
its constitutional liberties and historically laissez-faire media, Hong Kong is unfamiliar
territory to a communist regime used to having absolute control over the information and
ideas shared between its citizens.
Generally speaking, the relationship between technology and political repression
has been well-researched, especially as it pertains to Mainland China. Previous literature
is quite diverse in terms of theoretical framework and research design, providing an
interesting constellation of perspectives. Results of prior scholarship fall on a wide
spectrum in terms of whether or not technology plays a role in aiding or abetting political
consolidation in autocratic countries, a factor this project will seek to clarify for the case
of Hong Kong. Ultimately, prior literature will be used to frame this project’s
understanding of why the PRC utilized ICTs to limit digital political dialogue and
collective action during the Umbrella Movement despite Hong Kong’s legal guarantee of
freedom of speech.
The following chapter is divided into two major categories based on large
divisions in prior research. The first and largest section will analyze research focused on
the relationship between ICTs and authoritarian governance. For the purpose of providing
a detailed review, the first section will be divided into several sub-sections, each
investigating a different scholarly perspective on the relationship between government
control and ICTs. A second, smaller section will provide a general overview of ICTs and
democratization. This section will furnish additional context for the research question at
hand.

12

ICTs and autocracy
Following the Arab Spring movement, the internet and social media platforms
were lauded as virtual panaceas against repressive dictatorships. In the midst of Iran’s
Green Revolution, the New York Times described the “quintessential twenty-first century
conflict” as armed riot police versus mobile phone toting youth.22 Indeed, this perspective
of ICTs as “liberation technologies” is also rooted in journalistic and scholarly literature.
Prominent social movement scholars like Larry Diamond have acknowledged the
democratizing potential of digital communication.23 Despite the triumphs of social media
against tyranny in success stories like Egypt, there are still a number of global autocracies
that seem impermeable to the transformative potential of digital communication
networks. This apparent discrepancy raises questions about the effectiveness of ICTs as
conduits of political change, and invites further analysis of how authoritarian
governments are harnessing communication technology to solidify their own grip on
power.

Empowering the government
A significant number of scholars are highly critical of cyber-utopianism—the
notion that ICTs are inherently emancipatory—and are quick to explain that
communication technology is not limited to the hands of activists and can just as easily
be utilized by self-interested elites looking to preserve the status quo. Research in this
camp probes into how authoritarian regimes utilize ICTs behind the curtain to maintain

22

23

Nicholas Kristoff, “Tear Down This Cyberwall!” The New York Times, June 17, 2009.
Larry Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” Journal of Democracy, 21 (2010): 69-83.
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social control, and questions the potential of digital communication networks as conduits
for political change. This line of research advocates for a more realistic understanding of
ICTs, in which the weaknesses, drawbacks, and consequences of digital communication
are addressed.
One notable study directly questions the impact that digital communication
technology has on social movements. Researchers hypothesized that ICTs are an effective
conduit for the flow of information, but not for social organizing. They explain that usergenerated posts are most effectively used to criticize government policies, expose
corruption, and call into question the system of governance by serving as a virtual
alternative press, but not to mobilize mass movements. 24 This can be true even in
societies where the government has a strong hold on the media. Backing the argument
with content analysis and contemporary examples, researchers demonstrate that recent
mass social movements, such as the Iranian Green Movement, experienced a measure of
success by using ICTs to disseminate images and videos which drew attention to a
particular grievance. However, any attempts at actually orchestrating protests were
quickly quashed by the government, therefore preventing activists from achieving any of
their collective objectives. The authors also point out that freedom of information does
not necessarily correlate with freedom of association, a distinction apparent in
authoritarian states with relatively unrestricted digital spheres.
Research on the role of the internet and democratization in post-Soviet states
concluded that even in authoritarian countries with relatively unrestricted internet access,

Bruce Etling, Robert Faris, and John Palfrey, “Political Change in the Digital Age: The Fragility and
Promise of Online Organizing,” SAIS Review, 30 (2010): 40-41.
24
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pro-democracy movements are not guaranteed to take place.25 A notable case study
reveals that ICTs alone are often not powerful enough to depose a highly coercive
regime, or overcome deeply entrenched institutional and structural barriers.26
Additionally, the author highlights the importance of a powerful opposition movement,
since ICTs alone are unable to bring political inertia to a weak or fractured opposition.27
In sum, this line of research is dubious of the assumption that ICTs have a strong standalone impact on social movements or can effect political change. In other words, ICTs are
capable of effecting change only under the right social and instructional circumstances.
While the argument is certainly compelling, it is uncertain if lessons learned from the
post-Soviet study can be applied to China, which differs from Soviet-style top-down
authoritarianism in its heavier emphasis on citizen buy-in. In sum, the societies may
simply be too different for lessons learned from one to apply to both.
Another vein of research does not question the impact potential of ICTs on
furthering social movements, but does caution that digital communication technologies
can easily be used to strengthen and consolidate authoritarian regimes. This cautious
perspective is largely based on the observation that ICTs are not exclusive to social
activists, and that by treating ICTs as purely emancipatory, researchers have lost sight of
how authoritarian governments have masterfully adapted technology for the purposes of
surveillance, censorship and propaganda.28 Overall, the literature in this camp agrees that
censorship and propaganda are particularly relevant to the case of China, where the

Rachel Vanderhill, “Limits on the Democratizing Influence of the Internet: Lessons from Post-Soviet
States,” Demokratizatsiya 23 (2015): 55-56.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, xiv.
25

15

Golden Shield project, or Great Firewall as it is colloquially referred to in the West,
forms a complex system of restrictions on the websites, content, and information that can
be viewed by Chinese internet users. Authoritarian regimes rest on the control of
information, and in today’s digital, information-based societies, controlling the internet
means controlling the flow of information.
Scholars have investigated the full-range of the authoritarian censorship arsenal,
including website-blocking, deletion of politically objectionable material, and
surveillance. The Arab Spring movement has allowed scholars a glimpse at how
authoritarian regimes are simultaneously grappling with the challenges posed by ICTs
and learning how to harness them to consolidate and defend their power. A case study of
the 2009 election protests in Iran revealed the inherent duality of ICTs: While activists
were flocking to social media to disseminate information and coordinate collective
action, the government reacted in real-time by deploying a far-reaching censorship
network, repressing online protests, and using propaganda, rumors, and false information
to fuel confusion.29
In addition to understanding specifically how authoritarian governments use ICTs
to protect their own rule, of equal importance is understanding why. In a recent study
about censorship and self-expression in China, researchers analyze China’s far-reaching
internet censorship initiative in order to reverse-engineer the PRC’s policy objectives,
which are typically obscured by a shroud of secrecy. Researchers were somewhat
surprised to discover that China did not censor all information critical of the regime, but
only posts that showed a clear potential to snowball into collective action. A quantitative

Daniel Baldino and Jarrad Goold, “Iran and the Emergence of Information and Communications
Technology: The Evolution of Revolution?” Australian Journal of International Affairs 68 (2014): 19.
29
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analysis of popular key words revealed that any posts capable of inciting social
mobilization were deleted, even when the apparent call to action was apolitical in
nature.30 Historians point out that the influence of age-old Confucian traditions in
Chinese politics have created a pattern of legitimacy earned through collective action.31
As a result, China’s political elites have a long history of stemming potential
collectivization by clipping social ties between individuals.32 The ruling Chinese
Communist Party is acutely aware of the impact social movements have on their overall
legitimacy, and have even been known to carefully encourage protests that bolster their
image or re-direct popular ire towards a rival target, such as the protests against Japan’s
involvement in the Senkaku islands in 2012, while simultaneously quashing movements
that question the CCP’s ability to rule effectively.33 In the twenty-first century, this
dynamic has persisted as China adapts to new forms of communication technology.
Additionally, China’s system of censorship reveals not only the government’s focus on
stemming collective action of any kind, but the system’s level of sheer sophistication,
complexity, and subtlety.
The element of subtlety is something that modern authoritarian regimes strive for,
since research on authoritarian strategies of social control conclude that blatant coercion
damages regime legitimacy.34 In response, modern censorship methods have become
more discrete and geared towards thought-steering than blatantly blocking or deleting
Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government
Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” American Political Science Review 107 (2013): 31-34.
31
Elizabeth Perry, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China (New
York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).
32
Ibid.
33
Kevin McKenzie, "Troubled Waters: Security, Economic Development, And The
Senkaku/diaoyu Islands," Thesis, Illinois State University, 2014, http://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd/277.
34
Christian Goebel, “The Information Dilemma: How ICT Strengthen or Weaken Authoritarian Rule.”
Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 115, (2013): 179.
30
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undesirable information. A researcher at University of Hong Kong’s China Media Project
explains that China’s state-run press is becoming increasingly centered around telling
China’s “side of the story,” in other words, crafting a single state-approved narrative or
agenda.35 The goal of telling China’s story is the creation of a carefully engineered
information gap, which quietly obscures any information that could spark widespread
disapproval among the populace, all without internet users realizing it.36
At this point, it is important to note that the sophistication of technologicallyrooted, authoritarian methods of social control have evolved in step with the progress of
communication technology. The complexity and effectiveness of authoritarian internet
control paradigms can be broken into three generations. The first generation, spearheaded by China, is characterized by a national-level filtering scheme.37 Second
generation controls are much more difficult to detect, which provides the government a
screen of plausible deniability, and also extends into the country’s legal and normative
terrain to shape it in favor of the security structure.38 The most sophisticated level of
control is the third generation, which is hallmarked not by the direct intervention of the
first generation, but by subtler methods of social control, such as dialogue steering,
propaganda, and misinformation campaigns geared towards discrediting dissenting
voices.39 Presently, China is known to implement all three generations of technology in
their program, resulting in a highly sophisticated and pervasive paradigm of censorship,
surveillance, and dialogue-steering. Somewhat paradoxically, spikes in global internet
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user rates have created new spheres for free speech, but have also created an opening for
more extensive government control. The rise of “intermediary censorship,” in other
words content-monitoring that the government outsources to private parties such as
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Online Service Providers (OSPs), broaden the
government’s scope while allowing it to surpass its own limitations in terms of resources
and personnel. These newer, decentralized methods require ICT-based corporations, such
as ISPs, search engines, and blogging platforms, to be complicit with government
restrictions on content and by relinquishing user data on demand. U.S.-based corporation
Yahoo! came under scrutiny in 2005 after it yielded information about a Hong Kong
journalist which eventually led to his arrest.40 The rise of intermediary censorship poses
the greatest threat to activists in authoritarian states, who have to rely on secrecy and
anonymity in order to avoid unwanted attention or punishment.
Overall, research in this vein demonstrates specific ways in which authoritarian
governments are incentivized to control ICTs in order to protect their own position of
power. Related scholarship indicates that prior social movement research often
overlooked the capacity ICTs have to strengthen autocratic regimes, and stress the
importance of further research in order to fully understand the relationship between ICTs
and regime consolidation. A related camp of research, which explores the duality of
ICTs, will be covered in the following sub-section.
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A cautious take
A number of scholars acknowledge that in reality nothing as simple as “us versus
them” exists, and instead adopt a cautious and more nuanced approach to ICTs and
regime change. Research in this vein tends to acknowledge that ICTs have the potential
to strengthen or threaten authoritarian regimes in equal measure, the results of which
depend exclusively on how effectively forms of digital communication are managed by
the regime.
Recent research provides a detailed analysis of modern autocratic regimes’
highly-networked approach to authoritarian governance, and describes how online
activism has the potential to either hurt or help the regime. Specifically, researchers have
demonstrated how the Chinese regime has been particularly masterful about managing
digital communication in its various forms. In fact, China has been so adept at integrating
ICTs, that researcher Rebecca MacKinnon coined the phrase “networked
authoritarianism” to capture the full depth of its intricate strategy of social control.41
Networked authoritarianism describes how communication technology has fundamentally
altered the dynamic between the government and the populace as compared to classic
authoritarianism. ICTs allow individuals to express critical opinions and observations
about the regime, essentially creating a space for public political dialogue, which results
in a sense of freedom of expression and civic agency among digitally connected citizens.
However, despite the perception of freedom, citizens under networked authoritarian states
still lack formal channels of political participation, lack individual rights, and can face
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repercussions like jail time if deemed a threat to the state. 42 Additionally, digital activism
can inadvertently strengthen autocratic regimes through broad-sweeping calls to action,
like the end of one-party governance or demands for free elections, which can cause
factions within the regime to join forces against the perceived, collective threat. Another
study echoes this concern, describing how external threats to the party often cause hardliners and soft-liners to band together.43
The duality of ICTs can also be extended to social activists, illustrating how the
digital tools used to collectivize in non-democratic societies can actually leave activists
vulnerable. This is largely due to authoritarian regimes weaving their social control
programs into the country’s institutional and legal fabric. As touched on previously, this
process occurs in three “generations,” the first of which involves setting up a system of
censorship, filtering, and digital surveillance, which poses the least overall risk to
activists. However, the second and third generations include more invasive measures like
warrantless investigations, deliberate internet black-outs, and collusion between the
government and private companies regarding information control. Additionally,
constructing a legal environment around information control strips away privacy
protections and criminalizes certain behaviors associated with social activism. Overall,
scholars acknowledge that ICTs possess a strong potential for inciting mass prodemocracy movements, but ultimately conclude that obstacles such as institutional
barriers, government policy, and corporate complicity can prevent that potential from
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being realized. One study of note concludes that transparency, rule of law, and
accountability must be improved in order for activists to be fully protected.44
Another line of research developed a model that demonstrates how ICTs have the
power to either strengthen or undermine authoritarian rule. The author of a notable study
argues that even digitally-connected autocracies can resist democratization by using ICTs
to systematically consolidate their own power. Certain types of digital technology
promote government resilience by preventing social unrest, disseminating subtle and
persuasive forms of propaganda, and by providing officials with a pulse on public
opinion and social grievances.45 Related scholarship also posits that by approaching ICTs
as a force to be harnessed for economic growth, the Chinese regime was also able to
increase various facets of its power and therefore further entrench itself in governance.
The Chinese model’s capacity for resilience is exceptionally noticeable when compared
to regimes that take a more aggressive stance against ICT penetration, such as Myanmar,
which suffers from the economic frailty that goes hand-in-hand with an underdeveloped
digital infrastructure.
Scholarship exploring the duality of ICTs recognize that technology has the
capacity to either strengthen or challenge the grip of authoritarian regimes. Research in
this camp largely relies on case study analyses in order to demonstrate how different
regimes adapt (or fail to adapt) to the challenges posed by widespread internet and mobile
phone usage. China is cited repeatedly for its ability to effectively evolve its methods of
social control in order to keep up with the changing technological landscape. Research

44

Ibid
King, Pan, and Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences
Collective Expression,” 326-343.
45

22

also cites how ICTs can actually open up social activists to certain vulnerabilities, which
in turn affects their ability to successfully mobilize against a regime. Since a huge
component of regime resilience is the ability to mitigate external threats, such as mass
social movements, the next section will delve into the relationship between ICTs and
social activism.

ICTs: Destabilizing autocracy
Part of the broader dialogue of regime change and collective action is the impact
that ICTs have on social activism. This vein of research is integral to the research topic at
hand because, as explained in the previous section, collective action can play a direct role
in facilitating regime change, and a large body of scholarship indicates that ICTs
strengthen social movements. This section will provide an overview of recent research on
ICTs and democratization, with the goal of providing a big picture understanding of why
authoritarian regimes are concerned with keeping a tight rein on communication
technologies.
Despite the preponderance of censorship mechanisms, some scholars remain
optimistic that the ability to participate in digital, public discourses is enough to fuel
collective energy and invoke meaningful political change. This school of thought stresses
that the sense of agency and participation fostered by digital discourse cannot be
mitigated by censorship.46 Prominent social movement scholar Larry Diamond
encapsulates ICTs’ potential for democratization in the term “liberation technology.” The
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term includes any form of ICT capable of increasing political, economic, and social
liberties that “enables citizens to report news, expose wrongdoing, express opinions,
mobilize protest, monitor elections, scrutinize government, deepen participation, and
expand the horizons of freedom.”47 Diamond highlights newer forms of technology, like
the internet and mobile phones, as being more conducive to mobilization than older,
passive forms of technology like the radio and television. The active, participatory nature
of newer generation ICTs create a decentralized environment ripe for grass roots action
and the rapid sharing of information among countless users. While Diamond certainly
takes a more optimistic stance for technology’s pro-democratic potential, he ultimately
concludes that technology is simply a tool without any inherent political allegiance.
An under-examined aspect of ICT-enabled collective action is the impact of
anonymity. A study of note on this topic explains that ICTs are characterized by isolation
and anonymity, but somewhat paradoxically, can also facilitate solidarity and
collectivization. The ability to act anonymously is obviously a significant advantage for
individuals fearing backlash or repercussions for taking part in actions critical of the
government.
A critical debate at the center of this topic is whether or not the internet actually
facilitates democratic action at all or merely provides the illusion of doing so. A number
of scholars argue that technology does in fact facilitate meaningful democratic action.48
The impact of modernization and globalization, including the erosion of state borders, the
emergence of transnational corporations, and citizen apathy towards official methods of
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political participation like voting have cleared the way for alternative forms of
engagement outside of the mainstream. Technology has also altered the landscape of
political action by introducing brand new forms of participation.49 Additionally, the use
of ICTs has shifted the focus of collective goals to favor single-issue, value driven goals
rather than the ideologically-rooted, broad-sweeping social changes of the past. This
body of research reveals a fascinating trend in how emerging forms of technology are
actually re-shaping the landscape of social movements.
Broadly, the literature has identified three major points at which technology and
participation potentially intersect: participation costs, collective identity, and a sense of
community.50 Participation costs are affected in that ICTs allow for cheaper, more
efficient methods of communication between individuals within a group. Collective
identity is the concept of group solidarity through shared grievances. This is related to the
networking potential of the internet, which enhances the organizational structure of social
movements by solidifying loosely structured networks and optimizing the flow of
information.51 Lastly, a sense of community is derived from individuals connecting
through shared interest, goals, or grievances. This sense of community ties into the idea
that the internet has emerged as a new public sphere capable of sustaining democratic
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dialogue.52 Research has also indicated, somewhat counter intuitively, that activities
characterized by isolation and anonymity can actually enhance group attraction.53
A major discussion amongst social movement researchers relates to how protest
tactics are affected by the use of ICTs. Rapid mobilization, swarming behavior, and the
ability to act on multiple fronts simultaneously are all benefits of technologically aided
communication. An additional benefit is that the near instantaneous dissemination of
information creates transparency and increases the public accountability of elites.54 This
phenomenon is known as the inverted panopticon, and is especially relevant to
populations under authoritarian rule.55
Despite the obvious benefits, some researchers caution against an over-reliance on
ICTs, stressing that technology is frequently wielded by authoritarian regimes in order to
further repress the populace which therefore renders any advances in communication
between private citizens moot. The integrity of information transmitted through ICTs has
also been called into question by researchers.56 False or misconstrued information can be
rapidly transmitted through communication networks and deleteriously impact the
understanding of critical issues or events connected to social movements.57 The effect
was apparent in the crack-down following the Iranian election protests during which
Twitter became rife with rumors such as “police helicopters were pouring acid and

52

Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: The Critique of Functionalist Reason.
Kai Sassenberg and Tom Postmes, “Cognitive and Strategic Processes in Small Groups: Effects of
Anonymity of the Self and Anonymity of the Group on Social Influence,” British Journal of Social
Psychology 41 (2002): 463-480.
54
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. The Advent of Netwar (Revisited) (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001).
55
Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).
56
José Márcio Ayers, “From the Streets to the Internet: the cyber-diffusion of contention.” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 566 (1999): 132-43.
57
Ibid.
53

26

boiling water on protesters,” a claim that could never be substantiated.58 An opposing
argument counters this notion by explaining that ICTs can just as easily be used to fact
check information and dissipate misinformation as well as the sort of sensationalist
apocrypha produced during the Iranian protests.59 Essentially, the Iranian example
underlines the notion that ICTs are simply a tool capable of producing a wide range of
results based on how they are utilized in a given situation.
Another vein of research skeptical of the pro-democratizing power of ICTs states
that access to the internet has no significant impact on citizen participation levels. A
number of studies observed that political participation rates in the United States have not
changed much since 1950 despite major technological advancements.60 The cause for this
lack of change is rooted in the political-psychological phenomenon that increased
exposure to low-cost information cannot enhance human beings’ ability to systematically
absorb it. While this assertion has broad implications in terms of human understanding of
information, his conclusions do not necessarily preclude an increase in accessing and
acting on said information.
The body of literature related to ICTs and social movement participation is
expansive and diverse in perspectives. The majority of researchers in this group agree
that ICTs have altered the landscape of political participation in some shape or form, with
the exception of a study that questions the relationship between ICTs and political action.
The methods of these studies also varied significantly and included both qualitative and
quantitative methods. Previous literature on the topic of social control and
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communication technology is varied but can generally be divided into the broad themes
of whether ICTs strengthen or weaken authoritarian regimes. Advocates of ICTs as tools
of regime survival cite how technology strengthens government capabilities for
censorship, surveillance, and propaganda. Those in favor of ICTs’ pro-democratizing
nature explain that technology can undermine autocratic rule by allowing activists to
communicate and organize in order to achieve collective goals, in addition to ICTs
serving as an alternative press to share criticism of the regime.
In terms of theoretical framework, theories related to social movements and regime
transition were most common in the literature. In prior studies, democratic transition
theory and authoritarian consolidation theory were popularly used as lenses to clarify the
role of ICTs under authoritarian regimes. Some researchers found that communication
technologies carried an intrinsic liberalizing effect, while other studies concluded that
ICTs could easily be co-opted by the government to stabilize its own rule. Social
movement theories, such as collective action theory, were typically employed for projects
focused on how successful social movements employed ICTs, but did not address failed
movements in equal measure. The following chapter will draw upon the literature to
establish a theoretical lens for this particular project.
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CHAPTER III
THEORY

The theoretical groundwork of this project seeks to explain why the PRC utilized
ICTs as a subtle method of social control to limit freedom of speech and collective action
during the 2014 Umbrella Movement. In order to answer this question, a deeper
understanding of the PRC’s underlying motivation is necessary. Based on related
research, authoritarian consolidation theory and the theory of collective action potential
were chosen as lenses to better understand different dimensions of the research question
at hand.

Authoritarian consolidation
Authoritarian consolidation theory seeks to explain the nature of how and why
certain authoritarian regimes persist while others collapse or transition toward
democracy. Traditionally, theories regarding regime change and democratic transition
hold that non-democratic regimes are gradually and inevitably gravitating towards
democratization. This is largely due to the assumption that authoritarian governments are
inherently frail based on fragile legitimacy and dependence on overtly coercive tactics of
social control.61 A number of authoritarian states, including China, seem to have
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weathered the “third wave”62 of democratic change and appear to be growing more stable
and complex over time. The relatively nascent authoritarian consolidation theory is
emerging from the growing number of scholars interested in how particular regimes have
resisted pressure to democratize, despite an overwhelming body of research that asserted
democratization was a nearly inevitable global phenomenon.
A core assumption of democratic transition theory is that all autocratic states are
gravitating towards the eventual end-goal of democracy. Recent research on the survival
of authoritarian regimes has uncovered a blind spot in democratic theories, pointing out
that prior theories focused on factors that precipitated change, neglecting to investigate
causes that lend stability to autocratic regimes.63 This new vein of research tunes into
regime strengths, which naturally increase the likelihood of regime stability, rather than
searching exclusively for weaknesses which might signal eventual transition.
Before further analyzing the root causes of consolidation, we must first answer this
question: what is consolidation? Generally, consolidation is defined as a regime’s
progression toward relative stability.64 Although democratic and authoritarian regimes
differ in numerous ways, the process of consolidation is actually quite similar for both in
that it occurs when a complex system of institutions and rules becomes uncontested.65
Ultimately, consolidation theory provides a framework for understanding the factors that
contribute to long-term regime stability. Key to regime stability and survival, for both
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authoritarian and democratic governments alike, is the accomplishment of comprehensive
authority, a status that describes a central government’s ability to effectively reign in
various social and political forces.66 While coercion can technically be utilized to
accomplish comprehensive authority, any newfound unity will be short-lived as coercive
powers tend to rapidly erode regime legitimacy.67
Factors influencing authoritarian consolidation are numerous, but can be grouped
into four broad categories including: institutional, attitudinal, economic, and external
factors.68 While all of these factors contribute to regime survival, the institutional aspect
was found to be most relevant to social movements and their resulting threat to stability.
Regime stability is integrally connected with institutional strength and pervasiveness, and
a key factor in regime resilience is the government’s capacity to effectively embed itself
in office, an endeavor which relies on a careful balance of power between elites, and the
perception of legitimacy between elites and on the populace. 69 Although authoritarian
regimes lack the electoral institutions of democracies, it is important to note that
leadership change still does occur within autocratic regimes and is not the same as regime
change, which indicates systemic upheaval. However, peace between elites is not the
only ingredient to stability.
Regime resilience also depends on the regime’s ability to manage conflicts
between elites and the populace. In democracies, this is achieved through regular
elections, universal suffrage, and written constitutions. In autocracies, different
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institutions exist to address the demands of the people in order to foster a sense of
legitimacy and long-term regime stability. These alternative institutions fulfill the doublebenefit of bolstering regime legitimacy in the eyes of the populace while allowing the
regime to remain in complete formal control of policy decisions.70 Overall, these
institutions are carefully designed with the intent of discouraging collective action. This
allows the government to acknowledge a certain degree of criticism while making only
minor policy adjustments. Additionally, it provides officials a direct method of
monitoring public opinion, which directly benefits the regime by providing insight into
the public’s thoughts, concerns, and grievances.71 Even in authoritarian regimes, it is
critical to have conflict resolution systems such as this bridging the interests of the people
and the elites.72 This system can also work as a pressure valve for social unrest. By
framing issues as easily solvable individual complaints, they are not likely to gain inertia
and grow into mass discontent.
Some scholars are skeptical of the integrity and effectiveness of these conflict
resolution institutions73. Rather than representing genuine democratic channels, critics
argue that these institutions instead fabricate a false veneer of dialogue between the
populace and their leaders, in addition to providing the government a channel for keeping
tabs on its citizens and transmitting propaganda.74 Studies show that complaints often go
unaddressed or unresolved, and that the government is likely using the system as a clever
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way of monitoring public opinion without any real intention of meaningfully addressing
the conflict.75
These institutions are significant because they allow the regime a high degree of
social control that does not rely on overtly coercive tactics like violence and terror.
Coercive power is key to resisting regime change, but if wielded improperly, can signal
weakness or even backfire to galvanize opposition movements.76 This highlights the
importance of carefully calibrated coercion, which aims to neutralize challenges with
minimal political fallout.77 ICTs enable governments to employ subtler methods of
coercion like censorship, surveillance, and digital crowd control, which are less harmful
to its public image and legitimacy than violent means of control. Relevant scholarship
further argues that consolidation involves the regime learning how to interact with
various political and social groups in a non-despotic manner, therefore reducing the risky
side-effects associated with blatant coercion.78 In terms of why only particular
authoritarian regimes, like China and Russia, experience long-term survival while others
do not, researchers posit that the quality of the regime itself, rather than regime type,
determines regime longevity.79 This argument challenges the democratic transition
theorists’ assumption that all authoritarian regimes are destined to collapse, and opens the
door to examining how the qualities and characteristics of a particular regime determine
longevity.
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Collective action
The relationship between mass social movements and regime change is well
established, and supporting case studies abound from around the globe, including former
Eastern Bloc states and, more recently, social movements in the Middle East. Successful
authoritarian regimes understand that regime longevity depends on a careful balance of
perceived legitimacy and social order.
In social movement research, collective action theory is commonly cited by
researchers seeking to determine the causes and facilitating factors of mass
collectivization. This particular theory provides a basis for understanding why individuals
seek to collectivize in order to achieve certain common goals. Foundational research on
collective action theory states that individuals who share common or overlapping
interests will collectivize in order to achieve common goals.80 Understanding how and
why individuals aggregate around a specific cause will provide insight into how the PRC
identifies, addresses, and ultimately defuses collectivization.
The innovation of modern communication technology has introduced a new
element into social movement dynamic. ICTs can enable group collectivization in
societies that lack formal channels of participation, and in some cases can even overcome
intentional communication barriers like government censorship programs. The potential
for ICTs to enable collective action is an inherent paradox in that a medium characterized
by social isolation can facilitate social unity.81 The progression of research on the subject
has evolved over time, with early researchers arguing that the internet served to alienate
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individuals through the reduction of social cues, while more recent academic
investigation has revealed just the opposite.82 The depersonalizing effect of internet
activities serves to minimize differences between individuals and enhance a sense of
group sameness.83 Ultimately this phenomenon stems from the idea that social identity—
or the aspects of an individual's identity derived from group membership— remains
potent even in the absence of physical proximity.84 Additionally, a formal sense of
collective identity is not necessarily a requisite for collective action as long as “imagined
solidarity” exists as a unifying force.85 The idea of collectivization despite anonymity and
individual isolation is important, since authoritarian regimes have long relied on
atomization and alienation as strategies to thwart collective action. As a result, autocratic
strategies of social control have evolved to rely on more subtle forms of coercion and
manipulation online.
The intersection of mobilization and anonymity in relation to social movements is
especially relevant to understanding collective behavior in authoritarian states. Some
research stresses that activists are increasingly endangered by the content they publish
online due to the erosion of privacy.86 This is true in the case of Hong Kong, where
censorship policies and a fear of legal repercussions often prevent individuals from
publicly broadcasting opinions that could be considered subversive or critical of
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government actions.87 Essentially, communication technologies are eroding the ability of
autocratic regimes to maintain a monopoly on information, which in the past was a
classic authoritarian strategy for social control.
Research by Manual Castell demonstrates that ICTs increase transparency of
information which vastly minimizes “communication-free pockets,” resulting in group
empowerment and mobilization. Enhanced communication leads to increased visibility of
issues in the political sphere which directly stimulates participation in social movements.
Through this argument he indicates that technology is capable of fundamentally
modifying social structures.88 Castell’s research also makes an important distinction:
ICTs are a potent medium for change but not a cause. Extending Castell’s argument to
the research project at hand, ICTs will be treated as a non-causal medium while
examining their role in a series of recent protests in Hong Kong.
The PRC is well aware of how ICTs can enable unsanctioned channels of
communication between individuals, and the potential damage that the resulting social
movements can cause to the regime. In response to the threat of collective action, “the
stated perspective of the Chinese government is that limitations on horizontal
communications is a legitimate and effective action designed to protect its people.”89 In
other words, the Chinese government views collective action as a direct threat to social
and political stability and works to identify and defuse social movements before they can
gain any serious momentum. The overlapping lenses of the theory of collective action
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potential and authoritarian consolidation theory will shed light on how the PRC
approaches ICTs in regards to regime stability.
The theory of collective action potential originally appeared in a 2012 research
article by Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts. The article focuses on China’s
intricate censorship paradigm and posits that the paradigm’s ultimate goal is not to
simply block controversial messages, but to diffuse the larger threat of collective action.
King’s research utilizes a slight reframing of collective action theory that specifically
focuses on the causes of collective action in relation to the preventative measures the
government may take to diffuse it. This is based on the Chinese government’s perspective
that unsanctioned mass action of any sort threatens the order and safety of society. Since
China experiences a high number of “mass incidents” each year, reporting over 180,000
in 2010 alone,90 controlling collective action is a major concern of the communist
regime.91 In fact, the PRC takes the issue so seriously that local officials are evaluated inpart by the frequency of collective action in their localities.92
The theories explored in this section will provide an investigative lens for two
important aspects of this project. Authoritarian consolidation theory establishes a
framework for understanding how and why the PRC may utilize ICTs to strengthen its
power and mitigate external threats like social movements. Collection action theory
provides an in-depth understanding of the nature of social movements and how ICTs can
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be harnessed by activists to rapidly disseminate information and organize to achieve
collective goals, both of which threaten the PRC. Now that a theoretical backing has been
established, the next section will construct a research design for the specific question at
hand.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

The methods selected for this project will shed light on the question: Why did the
PRC utilize ICTs as a subtle means to limit freedom of speech and collective action
during the Umbrella Movement? This section will discuss the broad structure underlying
this project’s investigation, including the case study method, the illustrative analytic
approach, the specific variables under scrutiny, and data-collection methods.
A core assumption of this study is that the PRC is motivated by a drive to remain
in power, and to not allow its political influence to erode to the point that substantive
democratic reforms are made in Hong Kong. Based on a thorough investigation of the
Chinese government’s extensive usage of internet censorship and surveillance, this study
also assumes that the PRC is willing to manipulate ICTs in ways that align with its own
goal of self-preservation. This study will focus on several key methods the PRC
employed in order use ICTs to its own advantage, including censorship and surveillance.
In terms of delimitations, the analysis will be limited to the mass protest known as the
Umbrella Movement which occurred in Hong Kong during September and December
2014.
Since discerning how ICTs were utilized during the Umbrella Movement hinges
on a full understanding of key contextual and historical conditions, the case study was
selected as the most appropriate method for this particular research question. In an
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instructional publication on case study research, Robert Yin explains that the method is
ideal for research questions that focus on observable phenomenon grounded in a realworld context.93 Additionally, case studies are ideal for tackling the “how” and “why”
behind complex contemporary phenomena.
Another strength of the case study lies in its ability to synthesize multiple sources
of evidence into a multi-dimensional framework of analysis. This thesis will draw from a
number of sources in order to establish a comprehensive picture of events and to ensure
accuracy of evidence. Specifically, news articles, reported interviews with demonstrators,
and blog entries from the time frame of the protest will be used to establish a framework
for the events. Since ICTs allowed for activists to communicate and upload information
in real-time, a plethora of first-hand information exists documenting the protests.
Government usage of ICTs will be measured through data regarding censorship and
surveillance. Specifically, censorship can be gauged by the frequency of deleted internet
posts containing protest-related keywords, content deletion requests, and blocked
websites. Surveillance is primarily measured through the frequency of government
requests for user information, anecdotal evidence from activists, and information
regarding cyber-spying. Activist participation will be gauged through protest turnout
data, internet and mobile phone usage rates, and the number of downloads for “off the
grid” mobile phone app FireChat.
Since the PRC did not publically advertise the actions it took against antigovernment protestors, and freedom of speech in general, information from a series of
sources will be compiled in the analysis section to shed light on specifically how the
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government acted on the demonstrations. Information referencing the protests from
Xinhua, the official state newspaper, and state-controlled China Central Television can be
used to gauge the PRC’s public reaction to the events. Additionally, data collected from
select blogs and social media platforms reveal that certain keywords related to the
situation in Hong Kong were systematically censored.
This research project will draw upon two theoretical approaches to discuss the
results of the collected data: autocratic consolidation theory, and collective action theory.
The data compiled in the case study will be approached through the illustrative strategy,
which involves using an analytical tool for interpreting and clarifying a specific historical
event. For this project, autocratic consolidation theory will provide an interpretative lens
for the research question at hand. This theory was selected because it seeks to explain
how authoritarian regimes become embedded in societies through social, institutional, or
political factors. Additionally, a theory regarding collective action will be used in a
supporting role in order to establish an understanding of mobilization and social
movements. While the protestors are not the primary focus of this study, their motives,
methods, and strategies, particularly as they pertain to ICTs, provide critical context for
the analysis.
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CHAPTER V
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Since case studies provide a petri dish analysis of a real-life event, and these
events do not take place in a vacuum, it is critical to provide context in order not to arrive
at a one-sided, flawed, or overly simplistic conclusion. This chapter will ground the role
of ICTs within the 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong with the goal of shedding
light on the various factors that led to the PRC intervening in and ultimately containing
the pro-democracy movement.
Hong Kong’s Umbrella Protest is the most recent manifestation of the stark
social, political, and cultural differences between the territory and Mainland China. Hong
Kong’s divergent course began in 1842, when Great Britain acquired the peninsula as a
colony in the aftermath of the First Opium War. The British negotiated a ninety-nine year
lease with China, during which the colonial government sought to transform Hong Kong
into a major trading hub. Although the original treaty called for a ninety-nine year lease
of the territory, in reality Great Britain held on to Hong Kong for 150 years, which
resulted in a century-and-a-half of divergent social, economic, and political development
from the rest of China. As Hong Kong’s colonial occupation came to an end, the British
and Chinese negotiated terms for the territory’s transfer, including the creation of a miniconstitution called the Basic Law. Hong Kong’s constitution outlines the territory’s
governmental structure and the rights of its citizens, including the rights to free
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expression and assembly.94 Of particular interest is the Basic Law’s stipulation that its
“ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon
nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with
democratic procedures.”95
Since Hong Kong was transferred back to China in 1997, there have been dozens
of protests criticizing the Mainland’s governance policies. Hong Kongers’ growing sense
of dissatisfaction towards Beijing’s ability to manage the territory was solidified in a poll
that revealed the highest levels of disapproval in a decade.96 Of Hong Kong residents
between the ages of 21 and 29, 82 percent registered disapproval.97 The nature of the
protests indicates a schism in the expectations that Hong Kong and China each have for
the territory’s future. Hong Kong expects a progressively more liberal, Western-style
democracy which upholds rule of law as well as freedom of speech, association, and
universal suffrage. China expects to eventually assimilate Hong Kong into the
Mainland’s authoritarian administration, while providing the territory with a marginal
degree of social and political freedom beyond what the Mainland enjoys.
Under the current One Country, Two Systems policy, Hong Kong is legally
guaranteed certain liberties, such as freedom of speech and association.98 However, there
appears to be a widening grey zone between law and practice where the liberties of
residents of Hong Kong are not as clear cut as the constitutional language implies.
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Particularly, human rights issues such as the violation of free speech and assembly,
privacy rights, and covert surveillance are of concern. Although the legal rights outlined
in Hong Kong’s current constitution are guaranteed until 2047, at which point the
territory will be fully transferred over to the People’s Republic of China, some residents
of Hong Kong feel their freedoms are already slipping away as Mainland China gains
economic and political momentum.
A prime example of this authoritarian encroachment occurred in 2003 when,
under pressure from officials in Beijing, Hong Kong’s legislature attempted to quickly
and quietly pass an anti-sedition law that would allow for the warrantless search of
individuals or groups deemed subversive, a crime which could carry a life-time prison
sentence. People in Hong Kong were particularly alarmed by the broad, ambiguous
definition of “subversive” activity and the apparent disregard for due process. As a result,
Hong Kong erupted into the largest protests in the territory’s history, with over half a
million people taking to the streets. Due to the massive outcry, the law was ultimately
shelved.99 A similar incident played out a decade later in 2012, when a Beijing-backed
law to introduce a patriotic education program in Hong Kong schools once again drew
the public’s ire. The government explained that the classes were necessary to cultivate a
sense of shared national identity with China, but critics accused the program of being an
overt attempt at indoctrinating Hong Kong’s youth with pro-communist ideals. After
weeks of protests, the government finally compromised by making the classes
optional.100 Considering Hong Kongers lack a formal democratic channel with the
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Mainland, and that authoritarian China is not legally bound to appease popular demands,
Hong Kong’s protests have been surprisingly effective in blocking Beijing’s creeping
legal advancements.
Sparks began to fly once more in early 2014 as China and Hong Kong’s
administrations began hashing out details regarding election reforms for the territory. One
of the reforms promised to Hong Kong was universal suffrage by 2017. In other words,
residents of Hong Kong would be able to vote in open, free elections on who would
become the territory’s next Executive leader. In order to show Hong Kong’s commitment
to democracy, the civic group Occupy Central organized a nation-wide unofficial
referendum regarding the future of Hong Kong’s elections. Representatives of the PRC
immediately decried the referendum, stating in Xinhua, the official news outlet, that the
referendum was both invalid and illegal.101 Another official remarked, “No plot by a socalled ‘civil disobedience movement’ to force the central government to make
concessions on principles and on its bottom line stands any chance of success.”102
Beijing’s stance was clear. In addition to the official disapproval of the PRC, the
referendum was also plagued by cyber-attacks which temporarily shut down voting. The
election platform was struck by a sophisticated denial of service (DDOS) attack described
as “one of the largest and most persistent” of its kind.103 The referendum organizers
blamed hackers supported by the Chinese authorities, but the origin of the digital attack
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was never officially determined. However, despite the setbacks, over half a million
participants were able to cast symbolic ballots.104
Amid rising tensions over Hong Kong election reforms, Beijing released a white
paper reasserting its authority and comprehensive jurisdiction over the territory.105
According to Chinese authorities, the statement was released in order to clarify the
power-structure between Hong Kong and China, and to dispel any misunderstandings
regarding the current One Country, Two Systems policy. The doctrine stated that "Hong
Kong can maintain prosperity and stability for a long time only when the policy of 'onecountry, two systems' is fully understood and implemented," and additionally stressed the
importance of patriotism toward the central government.106 Alan Leong, a Hong Long
legislator and head of the pro-democratic Civic Party, explained that the statement was
unprecedented because the PRC had never before asserted that Hong Kong’s legislative
structure should prioritize the needs of the Mainland.107 The statement also appeared to
be a turning point for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy advocates, with some being
invigorated by what they perceived as an attack on Hong Kong’s liberties, while others
became disheartened and doubtful of the territory’s future.
The catalyst of the Umbrella Movement was the announcement on August 31,
2014, that the PRC’s electoral reforms would come in the form of a popular election
between candidates pre-chosen by officials in Beijing. In other words, the people of Hong
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Kong could select its Chief Executive, but Beijing would choose the candidates. Prodemocracy advocates ridiculed the plan, arguing that it made a mockery of universal
suffrage and gutted the democratic principle of “one person, one vote.” A detailed
breakdown of the ensuing events will be covered in the next section.

Timeline of Events
This project will address the reasons for which ICTs were used by the PRC in
order to limit freedom of speech and collective action during the Umbrella Movement
which began in Hong Kong in September 2014 and evolved into a seventy-nine day
occupation of the city’s financial district. The burst of protests that occurred in late
summer 2014 are over, but the struggle of pro-democratic activists to see their dream of
universal suffrage realized is still technically ongoing. The conclusion chapter will
provide a progress update on the issue of universal suffrage, as well as cover related
events which have taken place since the 2014 Umbrella protests.
On September 22, 2014, the first official protest of the Umbrella Movement began
when members of the student group Scholarism staged a week long class boycott
demanding that the PRC allow Hong Kong to hold open nominations for Chief Executive
candidates. Tens of thousands of protestors joined the movement in the ensuing days, and
on September 26, students stormed Hong Kong’s Civic Square, a public space abutting a
number of government buildings. Police responded with tear gas and arrested dozens of
demonstrators, including key student leaders. This marked a turning point in the
movement because it was the first time police demonstrated force against the peaceful
protestors. While the actions of the authorities aimed to slow down the movement,
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activists were galvanized by what they perceived as an attack on their constitutional
freedoms. The image of a demonstrator wielding an umbrella against a thick cloud of tear
gas spread like wildfire across social media and became a symbol for the movement.
Despite the movement’s growing inertia in the face of government pushback,
activists were dealt a major blow when days later an organized gang disrupted the
peaceful demonstrations. A violent mob of masked attackers tore through the
demonstration, attacking activists and slashing tents and banners in an attempt to incite
fear and chaos. After arresting 19 attackers, police confirmed that eight had ties to a local
organized crime group known as the Triad. The attacks sparked paranoia amongst
activists and resulted in accusations that the thugs were paid by the government to disrupt
the demonstration.108 Hong Kong officials similarly accused the PRC of orchestrating
terror to disperse protestors and condemned the use of physical force against peaceful
activists. 109 The territory’s pro-Beijing secretary of state launched back that the
accusations were fabricated and unfair, but encouraged the activists to disperse before
further violence occurred.110 Ultimately the claims could neither be officially confirmed
nor disproven, and the event became another fracture between the government and the
populace, marked by suspicion and distrust. The final, major event of the Umbrella
protest was the Peace Rally on October 4.111 Tens of thousands of demonstrators
converged in Hong Kong’s government district in defiance of the recent attacks against
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protestors, and in order to demonstrate their commitment to universal suffrage despite
government pushback.

Role of ICTs in the Umbrella Movement
Based on evidence gathered about the protests, this project found that the PRC
utilized ICTs to limit activist dialogue and collective action through censorship and
surveillance. This section is broken into two sub-sections which explore specific methods
the PRC utilized in order to maintain social control, and will also include some reference
to how activists likewise utilized ICTs in attempts to achieve their own goals. This will
ensure a balanced, full-picture analysis of the event.

Censorship
ICTs have formed the backbone of China’s censorship program since the internet
was first adopted by the country in 1994.112 Over the years, the censorship program has
become more sophisticated and has expanded to block dozens of websites and thousands
of forbidden terms. Recent research suggests that the goal of such an initiative is not to
simply halt digitally-based political dialogue, but to actively search for signs of collective
action potential, clip social ties, and therefore disrupt or mitigate the impact of these
budding movements.113
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From the start of the Umbrella Movement, activists very openly and actively
utilized ICTs as tools to plan, organize, and execute actions towards achieving collective
goals. Social media platforms and texting apps were particularly popular. With services
like Whatsapp and Firechat, individuals could mobilize their friends and acquaintances to
join them at protest sites as easily as asking them out to dinner.114 Activists also
harnessed digital technology as a launch pad for broad calls to action and appeals for
international support. A video by student activist Glacier Kwong titled “Please Help
Hong Kong,” was re-posted over a million times in the early days of the movement.115
This type of widespread international attention is potent because it can bolster activists
and encourage new participants to join.116
Evidence from the Umbrella Movement shows that PRC censors were actively
engaged in minimizing the digital impact of the movement. Censorship of search terms
related to the protests, deletion of related blog posts and images, and blocking platforms
like Instagram were all techniques the PRC utilized to disrupt communication both
between protestors, and between activists and the outside world. In addition to using
ICTs to stem collective action, PRC officials are also aware of the internet’s capacity to
serve as an alternative press. Since the PRC relies on a single, state-driven narrative,
sources of alternative, conflicting information can be highly problematic. As a result, the
PRC relied on ICT-based censorship initiatives to diffuse collection action and curtail the
spread of information related to the protests.
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Programs like the Hong Kong Transparency Report have actively tracked
censorship and other evidence of violations of free speech for years. Reports showed a
major increase in censorship activity during 2014. Between September and December
2014, the most active months of the Umbrella Movement, Hong Kong police made 101
demands for content deletion to various websites. In comparison, a total of 94 requests
were made during the four previous years combined. Observers from Hong Kong’s
academic community indicated that the way law enforcement demanded the removal of
content revealed potential abuse of power and lack of transparency.117
To internet users, the dramatic spike in censorship was apparent as blog entries
containing key words related to the unrest in Hong Kong rapidly disappeared. The
University of Hong Kong’s Weiboscope censorship-monitoring project reported a
massive spike in deleted posts during the week the protests began. At its peak, over 150
per 10,000 posts were being erased, with the term “Hong Kong” being the most widely
deleted.118 Interestingly, the term “Hong Kong protests” was not censored, and in fact
rapidly became one of the most popularly searched terms. However, search results
yielded only a list of carefully curated pro-government results, indicating that dialoguesteering was likely taking place.119
Users of Sina Weibo, a social media platform similar to Twitter popular
throughout China and Hong Kong, reported over 20 blocked terms including “Occupy
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Central” (an alternative name for the Umbrella Movement), the names of key student
leaders, protest sites such as the city’s Admiralty government district, and the names of
participating student groups. Additionally, search terms containing “Hong Kong”
followed by words like “student strike,” “tear gas,” “open fire,” and “disobey orders”
were also blocked. Phrases implying support of the movement, including “Go Hong
Kong” and “Today we are all Hong Kongers” were similarly banned.120The largest spike
in censorship activity occurring on and just after September 28, the day that riot police
took action against Hong Kong protestors and made several dozen arrests. On the same
date, Instagram was blocked after activists began uploading pictures of clashes with
police, with users receiving the error message “Cannot refresh stream.” The impetus of
the censorship was clear: thanks to social media, Beijing realized it was under the world’s
microscope.121 Situations like this reveal the inherent duality of ICTs: Web-based
visibility meant that Beijing’s hands were tied in terms of blatant physical action it could
take against demonstrators, but ICTs also allowed the government to rely more heavily
on subtler methods of control like censorship and the surveillance of activists.

Surveillance
Surveillance is another technique of social control commonly utilized by the
Chinese government. Unlike censorship, surveillance can be very difficult to detect and is
often not initially apparent to the individuals being monitored. For these reasons,
measurable data related to surveillance was difficult to find, and most evidence was
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anecdotal. That being said, in the year since the Hong Kong Umbrella Protests took
place, some evidence of the surveillance of activists, movement-sympathizers, and other
pro-democracy individuals has emerged. Based on evidence and accounts from activists,
Hong Kong police used a blend of ICT-based surveillance and more traditional methods
like physically shadowing activists.122
Phone tapping has a long history in Hong Kong, and reports of monitoring prodemocracy advocates and Mainland defectors stretch back to the late 1990’s. Legislation
introduced in 2006 was meant to regulate phone surveillance, but anecdotes from longtime activists reveal that the practice has far from vanished.123 Among democracy
supporters, reports of suspicious phone activity, including clicking, echoes, dropped calls,
garbled voices, and muffled voices speaking Mandarin are common.124 A founding
member of a leading pro-democracy organization in Hong Kong remarked, “My phone
was tapped for the first time in 1989. For years, I’d hear strange clicking sounds in my
calls. It’s started again in the recent years as I prepared for Occupy Central.”125 Dmitri
Alperovitch, co-founder of an American cybersecurity company, closely monitored the
situation in Hong Kong. “If you’re using a cellphone or landline in Hong Kong and
you’re one of the protestors, you should absolutely expect that your phone calls are being
listened to by the Chinese authorities. I would advise them to be paranoid.”126
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Although there were numerous reports and allegations of phone tapping, the vast
majority of evidence is anecdotal, and no concrete data exists to gage the frequency
which it occurred. However, internet-based surveillance was slightly less elusive and
more quantifiable than phone-based techniques. During the Umbrella movement, at least
one Beijing-linked spy ring was discovered by international cyber-security companies.
The spy ring, which was referred to as Deep Panda, was found to have covertly gained
access to computer networks of both pro-democracy activists and an affiliated political
party known for its pro-suffrage platform. Deep Panda’s cyber-spies were able to
infiltrate users’ computers and smart phones through a malware virus. By hijacking
someone’s contact list, Deep Panda could send out a fake message which appeared to be
from a friend, but when the message was opened, a virus was installed on the device
which could then collect emails, text messages, and eavesdrop on phone conversations.
Spies could also download the contact list off the infected device, and the cycle would
begin all over again as new spyware infected messages were sent out.127 Deep Panda, or a
similar cyber spy-ring, is also thought to be responsible for publically leaking emails and
files from several of Hong Kong’s high-profile democracy activists.
In the year of the protests, police made 4,234 requests for the personal
information of online users including email and IP addresses.128 Only a small number of
these were issued under court order. While this may seem startling, Hong Kong’s legal
framework has been shaped in such a way that residents are not adequately protected
from online surveillance. Due to a legal loophole, police surveillance via phone, fax, or
mail must be approved by a judge in the interest of public security or crime prevention,
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but the law does not cover online surveillance. Additionally, the language of the law itself
is quite vague. Jennifer Zhang, a researcher at University of Hong Kong, explains that
“The only law that protects user privacy, the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, is very
vague in this regard. It allows police to request user information from service providers
for a very simple and general ‘criminal prevention’ purpose.”129 For the tech-savvy,
surveillance was not necessarily an insurmountable threat. Umbrella activists, concerned
about police snooping, utilized off-the-grid mobile phone apps like FireChat to
communicate anonymously. FireChat was originally designed to be used at music
festivals and allows mobile phone users to connect directly to one another without
connecting to the internet. Since users were at no point connected to the internet, they left
no digital fingerprint, and their user information could not be traced by authorities.
Activists were able to plan, coordinate, share information, and encourage others to join
without fear of reprisals. The app was immensely popular with protestors. Data reveals
that it was downloaded over 500,000 times in the first two weeks of the protest, recorded
over 1.6 million chatrooms, and 10.2 million chat sessions.130 In a region like Hong
Kong, which boasts a cell phone usership rate of over 200 percent (roughly two phones
per person), an anonymous chat app is an immensely powerful communication tool.131
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CHAPTER VI
ANALYSIS

Communication technology played a central role in the struggle between Hong
Kong activists and the Mainland government during the 2014 Umbrella Movement.
Based on the evidence, this study found that the PRC was indeed using ICTs to limit the
flow of information and minimize collective action potential related to Hong Kong’s prodemocracy Umbrella movement. The gathered data centered on instances of censorship
and surveillance that the PRC engaged in during the protest.
The PRC’s usage of censorship during the protest is well-documented. Evidence
of censorship included prohibited search terms, content deletion, and blocked websites.
Reasons for this activity, according to the theoretical framework, are two-fold: In the
interest of self-preservation, the PRC is driven to limit the transmission of politically
sensitive information, in addition to taking a special interest in information that could
catalyze into collective action. These methods were clear in the way the PRC sterilized
blogs and websites during the time period of the protests. The deletion of protest-specific
content and keywords reveals that the PRC took an active role in attempting to minimize
the digital impact of the event. By focusing their censorship efforts on certain strategic
keywords, such as the names of well-known movement leaders and particular
demonstrations, the PRC was attempting to make it difficult for would-be participants to
mobilize at particular protest sites. These actions are supported by the theoretical
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framework’s expectation that China, while attempting to censor all politically sensitive
content, would focus on content that could mobilize collective action.132 The sheer rise in
censorship frequency is also indicative. Although the PRC routinely engages in web
censorship, the time period of the protests experienced a massive spike in content
deletion, indicating the Umbrella movement was a high priority for the PRC. In this case,
PRC censors launched a broad drag-net for politically sensitive content related to Hong
Kong’s struggle for democracy, but specifically focused on protest-specific keywords.
Surveillance was also employed by the PRC during the protests, but evidence
tended to be more anecdotal in nature with the exception of the frequency of police
requests for user information and the discovery of the Deep Panda cyber-spy network.
The scarcity of concrete evidence is not altogether surprising since surveillance falls
squarely into the second generation of social control, meaning techniques used to monitor
civilian activity are more subtle than direct censorship. The PRC, aware of the negative
impact that illegally monitoring citizens would have on their legitimacy, knows that
subtlety is key for regime preservation. As stated in the literature about authoritarian
consolidation, even autocratic regimes have to rely on a carefully maintained sense of
legitimacy in order to remain in power. The usage of surveillance ties into the need for
subtle methods of social control as highlighted in authoritarian consolidation theory.
While certain instances of surveillance are documented, overall data is limited, so it is
admittedly difficult to discern the exact level of the PRC’s direct involvement from
paranoia amongst activists.
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In summary, the evidence gathered from the Umbrella Movement supports major
components of both the theories of authoritarian consolidation and collective action
potential. Authoritarian consolidation theory explains that regimes survive through subtle
social coercion. This is supported by evidence of the censorship of protest-related key
words, the promotion of patriotic content, and the surveillance and intimidation of
activists. Together, these techniques work to steer the public perception of the events
while simultaneously minimizing their digital impact. As theory predicted, the PRC used
ICTs to employ subtle mechanism of social control with the goal of maintaining the
delicate balance between power consolidation and perceptions of legitimacy.
The PRC’s approach to coercive tactics against unrest in the Mainland is wellillustrated by a case in 2009 when the Chinese government instituted an internet ban to
the province of Xinjiang after a period of rioting, leaving seven million users without
access to the Net for ten months. The government justified the ban by explaining that the
riots were organized using the internet and mobile phones.133 Xinjiang’s full internet ban
is an extreme example of how elites partner to control access, but subtler, more complex
systems are at work on a daily basis throughout China. Major internet service providers
and social media platforms are complicit with government censorship programs. An
editor of a popular Chinese micro-blogging website Sina.com published a blog post
detailing the company’s elaborate censorship scheme.134 A number of other popular
social media websites share similar programs, and according to anonymous testimonies
from their employees, are under “direct pressure from Chinese internet authorities to
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bolster their systems for monitoring content.”135 While the PRC did not go as far as a full
internet shutdown in Hong Kong, activists were fearful enough of the prospect that
thousands flocked to off-grid apps like FireChat which would allow them to maintain
communication in the event of a shutdown.136 Additionally, the Xinjiang case illustrates
that the PRC was comfortable employing openly repressive tactics on the Mainland but
not in Hong Kong.
In addition to substantiating the impact of coercion on regime legitimacy, the
social upheaval of the Umbrella protests also sheds light on the PRC’s progress towards
regime resilience, another key factor in long-term regime survival. Prior research
indicates that in the absence of formal democratic institutions, authoritarian governments
often establish alternative channels of participation to address citizen concerns or at least
create the illusion of doing so.137 According to authoritarian consolidation theory,
regimes lacking both formal and informal institutions through which the populace can
vent their opinions, complaints, and concerns, will rapidly lose legitimacy.138
In Mainland China, local government agencies were created to “absorb and
process demands, expand the consultative capacities of their systems, give a stake in the
system to various sections of their populations, and perhaps preempt demands for more
far-reaching and anti-systemic change.”1 For example, many Chinese localities also
employ e-governance platforms, where citizens can file concerns online. However, these
concerns often go unaddressed by the local authorities, and instead offer a thin veneer of
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political participation. E-governance platforms cannot address large or systemic issues,
but can target small problems like petty corruption or damaged urban infrastructure, the
results of which, if addressed, are tangibly visible to the populace and strengthen the
perception that the government is indeed responsive to citizen demands.139 ICTs have
become such a popular platform that the PRC actually encourages departments and
officials to set up micro-blogs in a further effort to expand online presence and steer
digital political discourse. Between January 2011 and December 2012, the number of
official blogs swelled from less than 1,000 to 130,000.140
While the PRC has established a number of these alternative channels in the
Mainland, including e-governance platforms and official blogs, they remain
underdeveloped in Hong Kong. Politically, the territory has been caught in awkward
limbo between the goal of Western-style free elections and the slowly encroaching
communist institutions of the Mainland since its transfer back to China in 1997. The
absence of direct communication between Hong Kongers and the Mainland government,
through either formal or informal channels, likely contributes to the collective frustration
that catalyzed the Umbrella Movement and similar pro-democratic protests. As long as
Hong Kong remains in limbo, the PRC’s legitimacy will be seriously compromised, and
the resulting likelihood of collective action high.
The second theory used in this research project, collective action theory,
establishes a lens through which to examine how authoritarian governments identify and
react to signs of budding collectivization. Recent findings on censorship conclude that
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posts by Chinese netizens criticizing the government are no more likely to be censored
than non-political posts. Instead, censorship is used strategically to clip social ties when
signs of collective action are evident.141 The PRC’s ability to predict, prevent, and defuse
collective action through calibrated coercion are key to the regime’s success and stability.
The government’s sensitivity makes sense given China’s historical tradition of political
legitimacy gained through collective action.142 Any hint of social unrest is treated as a
potential threat to the country’s political stability. As a result, China has built the world’s
most complex, labyrinthine system of information filters, which is made possible by
ICTs.
For activists, ICTs came into play as an unsanctioned avenue for political
dialogue. Citizens of both Mainland China and Hong Kong are quick to turn to digital
mediums as platforms to express their political views. Microblogs and social media sites
have been used to voice complaints, express criticism and political opinions, and expose
corruption. During the Umbrella Movement, activists turned to informal channels of
participation like microblogs, social media platforms, and off-the-grid messaging
applications to disseminate information and coordinate demonstrations. The looming
threat of networked collective action has spurred the PRC to adapt its governance
strategy to a more deliberative approach in order to maintain legitimacy.
Fear of repercussions for publically expressing political opinions are not limited
to private citizens. A study conducted in 2008 discovered that 30 percent of Hong Kong
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journalists admitted to having self-censored their work, and another 58 percent of
respondents reported that self-censorship has increased since China absorbed Hong Kong
1997. These numbers reveal a clear concern amongst journalists about publically
attaching their names to content that could be considered controversial or politically
dangerous. As stated previously, many Umbrella Protestors turned to off-grid mobile
phone applications which allowed activists to connect anonymously to one another in
order to evade both censorship and surveillance. Anonymity is one of the major
advantages that ICTs provide to activists.
Government actions to maintain social order, especially those occurring in a legal
or moral gray zone, are often purposefully done in a cloak-and-dagger fashion that makes
them difficult to prove. This can create an atmosphere of paranoia, with some instances
being justifiable while other instances are purely imagined. While there is enough
concrete evidence to suggest that the PRC actively engaged in censorship and some
instances of illegal surveillance, the impact of these actions could have possibly been
exaggerated by the prevailing atmosphere of suspicion and paranoia among activists. A
possible alternative explanation for the results, and a possible avenue of future research
on the topic, would be the role that self-censorship and paranoia plays among activists in
authoritarian countries.
The PRC’s methods for mitigating collective action in Hong Kong are clear, but
of equal importance are the PRC’s reasons for doing so, especially in light of the fact that
Hong Kong’s constitution both guarantees freedom of expression and universal suffrage.
Circling back to the research question at hand, why did China attempt to undermine Hong
Kong activists’ legal right to free expression in order to prevent the democratic elections
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promised in Hong Kong’s constitution? In summary, the PRC’s leadership fears that
universal suffrage in Hong Kong will disrupt China’s delicate process of authoritarian
consolidation. While political leaders in China are typically secretive about the innerworkings of the Communist Party’s strategic objectives, evidence suggests that Hong
Kong’s democratic transition could threaten the party’s grip on power in several key
ways.
First is the PRC’s level of legitimacy. Regimes both democratic and authoritarian
are built on a foundation of legitimacy that, if eroded, compromised, or destroyed,
typically sound the death knell of the regime in question. A damaged sense of legitimacy
can leave regimes vulnerable to internal agitation and demands for regime change. From
the perspective of PRC leadership, a most troubling consequence of a democratic Hong
Kong can be referred to as “democratic contagion.”143 PRC leaders undoubtedly watched
the Arab Spring unfold as, one by one, long-standing authoritarian regimes succumbed to
unrest and political upheaval which spread across the region like sparks to dry grass.
Similarly, the same PRC leaders observed how shortly after Hong Kong erupted into
protests, social media posts in solidarity with the activists began appearing on Mainlandbased blogs.144 Users uploaded posts like “Dictators will always be eliminated, and
democracy can’t be stopped,” and “Support Hong Kong! If you [the protesters] hang
back, our situation today will be your situation tomorrow!!!”145 A few activists in
Shanghai even uploaded pictures of themselves with signs bearing pro-democracy
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messages.146 While any protest-related posts were quickly deleted, it is clear that ICTs
enabled the rapid transmission of ideas and provided an opportunity for solidarity and
sympathy between users. What the censors, and by association the PRC leadership, fears
is that ICTs can act as a vector for democratic contagion, or the idea that a prodemocracy movement could spread into China via social media and erupt into a full-blow
political movement which could prove disastrous to the regime.147
Second, a democratic Hong Kong could impact China’s foreign relations in ways
that are unfavorable to the PRC. Leaders of China’s Communist Party have long
suspected Western powers of fueling unrest in Hong Kong. In February 2014, just
months after the Umbrella Movement, a high-ranking communist party official stated
that, “International political forces and anti-CCP148 international organizations are deeply
involved, at the political, organizational, societal, and community levels, in transforming
Hong Kong into an anti-CCP and anti-China region and making Hong Kong a battlefield
of international political power.”149 Similarly, the former director of China’s procommunist publication Xinhua accused foreign and local powers of conspiring to seize
power in Hong Kong.150 If democratic elections were to come about in Hong Kong, the
PRC fears that Western-backed candidates would rise to power and essentially allow
foreign powers a back door into China’s political sphere.
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In addition to effecting US-China relations, democracy in Hong Kong could
potentially shift China’s dynamic with Taiwan.151 While Hong Kong is China’s crown
jewel in terms of trade and development, the territory’s acquisition was still only one
facet of the PRC’s long-term plan for consolidation and expansion. Since Taiwan broke
away from the Mainland following Mao’s ascent in 1949, the PRC has made it a priority
to win the island back. The PRC’s main point of negotiating Taiwan’s return is the
success of the “One Country, Two Systems” model of Hong Kong and Macau.152 Hong
Kong’s departure from the model would signal the model’s failure, which could
potentially nix the PRC’s key negotiating tactic with Taiwan. Chinese leaders have
repeatedly stressed the importance of winning back Taiwan, so any back-pedaling would
be a major blow to the PRC’s reunification plan.
For the reasons stated above, the PRC intervened in ways that quarantined the
Umbrella Movement, including halting the spread of information online, undermining
activists’ ability to collectivize, and using surveillance to track and intimidate activists.
While the prospect of an angry group of cell phone-wielding students facing down the
full force of the PRC seems doomed to failure, evidence from the protests suggests that
activists may yet have reason to remain optimistic. Ironically, by refusing to compromise
with activists as they have done in the past, the PRC may have actually fanned the flames
of the movement so that the conflict grew substantially before finally losing momentum
in the winter of 2014. As the PRC cracked down, more activists were galvanized to join
the cause, and the international community began to pay attention to the Umbrella
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Movement despite smaller, but ultimately more effective, protests having slipped by in
the past. While the initial vigor and energy of the movement died down in 2014, key
leaders have vowed to continue their struggle for universal suffrage. The following
chapter will provide updates regarding what has happened since the main protests ended
in the winter of 2014. Given this information, perhaps the question of why Hong Kong
activists failed may be re-framed as why Hong Kong activists have not yet succeeded.
In short, in a world where authoritarian governance unexpectedly survived into
the twenty-first century, it is important for researchers to fully explore the tactics these
regimes use to perpetuate their rule and the reasoning behind these decisions. ICTs have
also radically changed the landscape of civilian participation in social and political
dialogues. In the past decade, the world has seen cases of protestors harnessing ICTs to
triumph over dictatorships, and other cases where activists wielded the same technology
without achieving their collective goals. Case study research can reveal why certain
movements succeeded while others did not by taking into account the unique context in
which the events took place. The results of these studies can help scholars and
policymakers more fully understand the unique obstacles that activists must overcome in
order achieve common goals. The project’s findings further illuminate the sophisticated
mechanisms of ICT-rooted social control that the PRC employs against activists, in
addition to providing a more nuanced understanding of the PRC’s motivations for
intervention, for the benefit of future scholars, policymakers, and activists.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

This project investigated how the PRC utilized ICTs to diffuse collective action
and halt the flow of protest-related information during Hong Kong’s 2014 Umbrella
Movement. Through a combination of primary sources from social media outlets and
interviews, and secondary sources such as news articles and academic research, this
thesis has established a contextual analysis of what role ICTs played in maintaining
social order during the protests.
In Chapter Three, this project proposed a synthesis of two theories: Authoritarian
consolidation theory and collective action theory. Through this theoretical framework,
this paper argued that the government would be able to effectively prevent protestors
from meeting their goals by diffusing collective action potential and by limiting ICTs as
an unsanctioned avenue for political dialogue. Evidence gathered during the protests and
the fact that activists did not meet their goal of universal suffrage support the project’s
hypothesis. That being said, it is important to note the ongoing nature of Hong Kong’s
unrest. While the future of the territory’s bid for universal suffrage appears to be far from
over, this paper focused specifically on the three month period between September and
December 2014, which marked the height of the protests, and found that during that time
the PRC was able to prevent pro-democratic activists from meeting their objective of
universal suffrage.
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Over a year has passed since the Umbrella protests exploded at the heart of Hong
Kong’s government district. This section will provide pertinent updates on the
movement, which has lost much of its momentum but is still ultimately ongoing among a
small group of devoted activists. A major victory for pro-democracy activists occurred in
June 2015 when Hong Kong’s legislature vetoed Beijing’s controversial electoral reform
proposal. The reforms, which generated the initial spark of the Umbrella movement,
would have allowed Hong Kong residents to vote for their executive leaders, but
candidates would come from a list pre-selected by officials in Beijing. Of the 37
members of the legislative council who voted, 28 rejected the reforms. While this is
certainly a huge accomplishment for advocates of universal suffrage, the veto does not
guarantee that a more progressive plan will be introduced. The reactions of certain key
leaders to the veto are also not altogether promising for the pro-democracy base. Leung
Chun-ying, Hong Kong’s current leader and a vocal advocate of Beijing, framed the veto
as a major loss: “Today 28 legco153 members voted against the wishes of the majority of
Hong Kong people, and denied them the democratic right to elect the chief executive in
the next election.”154 While the tone of Leung’s comment was one of disappointment, the
PRC’s official statement ridiculed the decision, remarking that it, “…fully exposes their
selfish interests, hinders Hong Kong’s democratic development and damages the essence
of Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability.”155 Since making the statement, China has not
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altered its stance or given any indication that it is willing to further negotiate its position
on future elections.
Pro-democracy advocates, galvanized by the defeat of the reform package, once
again flooded the streets of Hong Kong in July 2015. Activists demanded the resignation
of Leung Chun-ying, Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing executive leader. With just over 48,000
protestors, the march was one of the smallest of the Umbrella movement, but activists did
not necessarily interpret the low turn-out as a sign of concern. Johnson Yeung, an
organizer with Hong Kong’s Civil Human Rights Watch explained that, “Hong Kong
people have been through a lot and they’ve mobilized massively over the past few years.
So after the veto, it’s quite natural for them to want to take a rest.”156 After the victory of
early summer, August 2015 dealt a sobering blow to the movement when key protest
leaders were charged with the crimes of unlawful assembly and inciting the participation
of others.157 If the student leaders are convicted, they could spend up to five years in
prison. Despite their uncertain futures, the students expressed no regrets for their actions
and reiterated their unwavering commitment to bringing the right to vote to Hong
Kong.158
From a legal standpoint, the Umbrella movement has still not succeeded. Since
Beijing first stated its plan to pre-approve all candidates for Hong Kong’s future leaders,
it has not wavered on its decision, rescinded its position, or offered any opportunity for
negotiation with Hong Kong’s pro-democratic groups. The reasons for the movement’s
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failure to achieve its objective are numerous and complex, but on a macro-level, are due
to China’s goal to further consolidate its authoritarian rule. To allow a territory,
especially one as lucrative and financially coveted as Hong Kong, to branch off down a
path to democracy would only serve to chip away at China’s absolute control. On a
micro-level, China’s finely tuned program of censorship and surveillance was able to
minimize the impact of the movement despite the fact that activists had wide access to
ICTs.
Research of post-communist societies in Eastern Europe reveal that access to the
internet – even a relatively liberal internet – does not guarantee the success of social or
political movements against authoritarian regimes.159 Ultimately, the success of a
movement is tied to a complexity of factors including the resilience of the regime, the
strength of opposition forces, and structural, institutional, or societal barriers. Essentially,
ICTs are an asset for activists, but successful movements can only take place if the
conditions are right.160 In the case of Hong Kong, it is very likely that ICTs aided
activists in organization, mobilization, and the communication of their message to a
broader audience, but were unable to overcome the structural and institutional barriers
unique to Chinese authoritarian rule.
Since the term “Twitter revolution” and “Facebook revolution” were coined in
2009, a number of social movements and political upheavals around the globe have been
labeled as products of social media and other forms of communication technologies.
While some support this viewpoint of ICTs as liberators of the oppressed, others point
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out that ICTs are susceptible to government manipulation in order to maintain social
control and stem collective action.
A future opportunity for research involves investigating the concept of “upgraded
authoritarianism” in the context of China and Hong Kong. In essence, upgraded
authoritarianism captures the process of how authoritarian regimes adapt and evolve in
the face of pressure to democratize, rather than resist or capitulate.161 The results of this
evolutionary process are “hybrid regimes” which have learned how to balance old
mechanisms of authoritarian control with characteristics traditionally associated with
democratic regimes, such as economic openness, pseudo-democratic institutions, and the
appearance of a relatively unrestricted civil society.162 To be certain, these regimes are
not actually democracies. Coercive tactics such as intimidation, harassment, and arrests
are still employed, and the actions of citizens are carefully policed.
However, upgraded authoritarian regimes are continuously perfecting subtler
methods of social control in order to maintain a façade of progress away from the
blatantly repressive tactics historically employed by autocratic regimes. While prior
research on upgraded authoritarianism focuses on the Middle East, a case study on China
would provide insight into how governments in other regions of the world adapt to
democratic pressure. Additionally, a deeper understanding of China’s tactics would allow
activists, scholars, and policy makers ideas on how to potentially counter the process and
even gain traction for true democratic change.
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This research topic bears prescience as the advancement of technology accelerates
and access to ICTs increasingly saturates population centers. Since authoritarian regimes
hinge on tight control of information and communication, it goes without saying that
ICTs and their ability to fundamentally alter the flow of information will impact the
dynamic between the government and the populace. Hong Kong makes for an interesting
case since the country's tradition of laissez-faire attitudes towards free trade and
expression have essentially primed the populace for democratic discourse. The ongoing
political struggle between the people of Hong Kong and the Chinese government appears
to be long from over, with student leaders who participated in the Umbrella Movement
vowing to make a comeback. Heading into the future, it is likely that technology will play
a significant if unpredictable role by potentially lending a voice to the populace's
concerns, or by being shaped into another mechanism of authoritarian control.
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